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In The Singularity of Literature (2004), Derek Attridge set out the three cornerstones of his 
literary theory: singularity describes the work of literature’s capacity for endless 
transformation while retaining its identity as an act-event; inventiveness characterises the 
work as something absolutely new that has been both made and discovered; otherness is the 
quality of unpredictability and difference that challenges the expectations and values of the 
reader.  In The Work of Literature, Attridge amplifies, clarifies, and refines these ‘three 
different aspects of the literariness of the literary work’ (p.57), which are irretrievably 
interlocked in the experience of the act-event and cannot be elucidated in isolation.  A culture 
is sustained by that which it excludes and authors exploit this exclusion by means of 
inventiveness, creating a space in which otherness (also called alterity) can be apprehended.  
Otherness is not merely other to the culture in which the work is produced and received, but 
necessarily other such that it cannot be assimilated without the deconstruction of cultural 
norms that facilitates the work’s singularity.  A central concern of The Singularity of 
Literature was the relationship between the institutions of literature, modernism, and form on 
the one hand and ethical responsibility, irresponsibility, and insignificance on the other.  
Attridge offered a compelling argument for the continued significance of form to literature, 
augmented with a critical response to ten of J.M. Coetzee’s works in J.M. Coetzee and the 
Ethics of Reading (also published in 2004).  A central concern of The Work of Literature is 
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the similarity between literature and other art forms – music and painting in particular.  
Attridge is, however, over-ambitious and his case for singularity, inventiveness, and 
otherness as three different aspects of the artiness of the work of art is somewhat 
unconvincing. 
 
This comparison and contrast of The Singularity of Literature with The Work of Literature is 
unavoidable because Attridge is explicit that the latter is ‘conceived to some degree as a 
supplement’ (p.11) to the former.  As such, Part I consists of a cross-examination of the 
earlier book, a device that initially seems pretentious but is in fact very effective in 
articulating his mature conceptions of singularity, inventiveness, and otherness.  Part II, 
constituting two-thirds of the monograph, comprises nine essays (parts of which were 
published between 2005 and 2011) under the following headings: Justice, Singularity, 
Criticism, Context, Culture, Metaphor, Knowing, Affect, and Hospitality.  In his introduction 
Attridge states that ‘[e]ach of the chapters may be read on its own (and I’ve permitted myself 
a certain amount of repeated exposition of key ideas to make this possible)’ (p.12) and indeed 
the only serious problem in the work lies in the parenthesis.  There is simply too much 
repetition.  Part I makes an excellent supplement to The Singularity of Literature, but the 
addition of Part II makes for tedious reading in places.  This becomes particularly evident in 
the seventh chapter (Metaphor), which is both original and insightful, but begins with two 
pages wherein the by now all too familiar trio of singularity, inventiveness, and otherness are 
trotted out once again.  Similarly, Part II makes an excellent supplement either to Part I or to 
The Singularity of Literature – just not both together.  The best way to read The Work of 
Literature is thus – contra Attridge – on its own, as a detailed and rigorous defence of his 
literary theory, albeit it one lacking in the concision and elegance of The Singularity of 
Literature. 
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The contention that a book of literary theory stands alone is hardly condemnation and Part II 
foregrounds Attridge at his best, raising difficult and perennial dilemmas and addressing 
them without evasion or recourse to jargon.  To take three examples: can the benefits of 
literature be specified without reducing the value of a literary work to being a pleasing means 
to an educational end; how can one criticise a poem in a manner that simultaneously responds 
to the demands made by the work, acknowledges one’s cultural and personal limitations, and 
illuminates the work for other readers; and how can one take pleasure in reading a realistic 
representation of a decapitation without being a sadist or voyeur?  Attridge answers all of 
these questions in a straightforward yet sophisticated style, employing penetrating analyses of 
Emma Donoghue’s Room, Paul Muldoon’s ‘The Loaf’, and Cormac McCarthy’s Blood 
Meridian respectively.  The relationship between form and meaning had been discussed in 
both the works published in 2004 but Attridge adds a new dimension by exploring the 
relationship between form and emotion in his discussion of Blood Meridian.  The relation he 
identifies builds on his conception of staging (discussed briefly in Metaphor and in detail in 
The Singularity of Literature), the way in which the literary use of language both performs 
and distances itself from the functions of everyday usage.  The theatrical metaphor has great 
explanatory power and has been adopted in philosophy of literature.  John Gibson, for 
example, employs a phrase that is both a compliment and complement to Attridge when he 
defines a literary narrative as ‘a sustained dramatic gesture’.1 
 
If readers familiar with Attridge’s oeuvre are likely to be troubled by the repetition across 
The Singularity of Literature and both parts of The Work of Literature, those same readers 
will appreciate the evolution of his thought in several key areas.  Perhaps the most impressive 
of these is the development of what, following J. Hillis Miller, he calls the ethics of reading.  
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Attridge inaugurated his three aspects of the literary triumvirate in 1999, in a paper entitled 
‘Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other’; there he spoke of creativity itself as 
essentially virtuous, without considering the vicious ends to which it can be a means.  He 
elaborated his position in The Singularity of Literature, employing the rather awkward term 
ethicity to describe the way in which literary works stage ethical values.  It was never entirely 
clear why Attridge regarded ethicity as a desirable quality for, as with creativity, there is no 
necessary relation between virtue and the ethical values staged by a particular work.  In his 
critique of The Master of Petersburg in J.M. Coetzee and The Ethics of Reading (a book 
which is more concerned with the ethics of writing than reading), Attridge acknowledged the 
potential for ethical irresponsibility in inventiveness, but left the issue unresolved.  This 
omission is rectified in The Work of Literature, where he is very clear (to the point of being 
repetitive) that the otherness to which one responds in the literary work can affect one in a 
positive or negative way.  The experience of the act-event of certain works – such as Céline’s 
Voyage au Bout de la Nuit or Sarah Millin’s God’s Step-Children – is more likely to be 
vicious than virtuous, but the immorality (or amorality) does not disqualify the work as 
literature.  This admission is crucial in establishing the ethics of reading that emerges in Part 
II of The Work of Literature.  The demand made by the work of literature to be read as a 
work of literature is an ethical demand and it is the reader’s responsibility to read 
responsively.  For Attridge, reading is an ethical act because it involves the acceptance of 
both the invitation of the author and the otherness to which the work exposes one.  The reader 
who engages with the work as a work of literature has this responsibility imposed upon her 
and this is particularly relevant to critical practice.  The ethics of reading is thus – to use 
Attridge’s earlier distinction – an ethics as opposed to a morality of reading since the moral 
valence of the act-event is determined by the particular otherness involved.2  Attridge’s 
recognition of this distinction makes his account of the relationship between literature and 
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ethics so much more astute than those of the many theorists and philosophers who have 
attempted to weld the literary to positive ethical value irrespective of the practicalities or 
consequences.  Martha Nussbaum’s Poetic Justice is a paradigmatic example but her thesis 
that reading the literary canon is an exercise of the moral imagination which is instrumentally 
valuable seems naïve in comparison to the inclusiveness and nuance of Attridge’s alternative.  
His ethics also underscores an important aspect of reading that Nussbaum and other moralists 
ignore, the element of risk.  To read a work of literature responsibly is to open oneself to 
being transformed by that work and there are no guarantees that the transformation will be a 
desirable one.  If there were guarantees, then the work could not be truly transformative in the 
first place, which is precisely why the institution of literature requires perceptive, responsible, 
and sincere critics and theorists – like Attridge himself. 
 
Notes 
1 John Gibson, Fiction and the Weave of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 117. 
2 Derek Attridge, The Singularity of Literature (London: Routledge, 2004), 126-7. 
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